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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
Impact of the ECtHR Rulings on Turkey's
Democratization: An Evaluation
Ergun Ozbudun* & Fbsun Thrkmen**
ABSTRACT
Turkey has long retained the record of individual applications before the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). On the other hand, the ECtHR
has been playing a crucial role in the democratization of this country, as
most of its rulings were followed by substantial reforms. This, however,
cannot conceal a dichotomy: although the reforms reflect the political
will of the government, the decisions rendered by national courts often
indicate the opposite, hampering the democratization process and leaving
the country with a judiciary impasse. The reasons and consequences of this
phenomenon are analyzed in this essay.
I. INTRODUCTION
Turkey recognized the binding jurisdiction of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) in 1990. Since then the ECtHR had received more petitions
from Turkey than from any other signatory of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)-until
Russia became party to the Convention. In late 2010, the Court had deliv-
ered 2,573 judgments concerning Turkey, of which 2,245 found at least one
violation of the Convention.' Violations therefore amounted to 87 percent,
* Ergun Ozbudun is Professor of Constitutional Law at Istanbul *ehir University and member
of the Venice Commission.
**Filsun Tilrkmen is Associate Professor of International Relations at Galatasaray University,
Istanbul, and Chair of the IPSA Human Rights Research Committee.
1. This places Turkey on top of the Court's fifty year-old condemnations list. European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR), Country Fact Sheets 1959-2010 (2012), available at http://
www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=reports&c=.
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whereas cases where no violation was found were only 2 percent, with
friendly settlements standing at 8 percent and other judgments at 3 percent.
By the end of 2011, total pending applications originating from Turkey had
reached 19,988, with 17,220 pending before the Court. 2 At the same time,
it is undeniable that the ECtHR was playing a crucial role in the democra-
tization of this country through the enhancement of human rights, as most
of its rulings were followed by substantial reforms undertaken by Ankara in
the realm of fundamental freedoms. Setting aside the fact that its compli-
ance with the ECtHR rulings is an essential condition for Turkey's eventual
membership in the European Union, this Court has also provided a blueprint
for normative change.' Promulgated since 2001 within the context of the
EU accession process, reforms mainly include three series of Constitutional
amendments and nine law packages that total to around 500 laws. The case
law, emanating from the various chambers of the Court of Cassation and
the Council of State as well as courts of first instance, does not properly
reflect the influence of European human rights norms and principles. This
dichotomy reveals a paradoxical situation prevailing in Turkey. Although the
enactment of the above mentioned reforms reflects a clear political will on
the part of the government, the verdicts rendered by various courts often
indicate the opposite. Further enhanced by the support of a state-centric
bureaucracy, such decisions lead, in turn, to more condemnations by the
ECtHR. This situation not only hampers the democratization process but also
leaves the country at a judiciary impasse that some experts simply refer to
as "lawfare." Like in warfare, there is an aim to conduct internal political
struggles on the terrain of legal argumentation and courts of law.4
On the basis of this assumption, this essay attempts to a) identify and
discuss some of the most prominent issues where the above pattern applies
(i.e. freedom of expression, minority rights, party closures), b) tackle the
underlying reasons of the attitude of the judiciary (i.e. nationalist mentality,
state authoritarianism), and c) explore recent developments as partial solu-
tions to the problem (i.e. latest constitutional amendments).
II. PART 1: MAIN AREAS OF INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE
RULINGS OF THE ECTHR AND TURKEY'S JURISPRUDENCE
Known as part of the most effective and advanced human rights regime
in the world, the ECtHR has been playing a key role in reforming Turkey's
2. ECtHR, Press Country Profile, available at https://ais.ku.edu.tr/course/1 8873/ECHR%20
and%20Turkey.pdf
3. Thomas W. Smith, Leveraging Norms: The ECHR and Turkey's Human Rights Reforms,
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY 262-63 (Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat ed., 2007).
4. Hilal Elver & Richard Falk, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Abusing the Rule of Law in
Turkey (18 Aug. 2008), available at http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2008/08/18
falk-elver turkey.php.
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democracy through its impact on the country's legal system. Since Ankara
recognized the right to individual applications in 1987 and the binding
jurisdiction of the Court in 1990, the verdicts of the Court have been in-
strumental in legitimizing a much wider spectrum of liberal and individual
models of rights than those guaranteed thus far by largely state-centric Turkish
law. This means that the Turkish judiciary not only tackled cases from the
perspective of an authoritarian/communitarian tradition but also remained
impervious to international human rights law. Considered at first only as
"supporting norms," those international instruments began to be taken into
consideration by the Constitutional Court as "supra-constitutional norms"
in 1990, before Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution on the force of inter-
national agreements was amended in 2004 so as to give the ECHR and the
case law of ECtHR direct effect and supremacy over national law. Yet, the
Turkish judiciary remains indifferent or "skeptical about applying the Conven-
tion to linguistic, religious, and expressive freedoms, citing concerns over
maintaining national unity." And except for a few palliative cases, "lower
courts almost never cite international law."'
However, if an incompatibility exists between national law and the
ECHR, this ought to be remedied in favor of the Convention, not only by
the executive and the legislative, but also by judicial organs themselves. In
doing so, the national judges should take into account the very nature of
this Convention, which bestows upon all of the signatories certain objective
responsibilities that exist without depending upon other states parties through
reciprocity. It should also be remembered that according to Article 27 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "A party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."6
Moreover, the European Convention creates a common judicial space as the
rulings of the Court reflect Europe's common values and legal standards. As
a candidate for EU membership, Turkey cannot afford to remain outside this
space given that it is important for its judiciary to consider itself as part of
a supranational legal community.7
It is self-evident that for the ECtHR, the most important criterion in
judging the restrictions of individual freedoms is to determine whether these
state-imposed limitations are necessary in a democratic society. And among
the necessary conditions for a society to be democratic, the Court deems
pluralism indispensable. Pluralism is, above all, important for the exercise
5. Smith, supra note 3, at 265.
6. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, U.N. Doc. A/CONF39/27 (1969),
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force 27 Jan. 1980), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
7. RizaTurmen (formerTurkish judge of the ECtHR), Avrupa Insan Haklan Sozlegmesi'nin 19
Hukukumuza Etkileri (The impact of the ECHR on our Internal Law), Opening Remarks
at the 38th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Constitutional Court, Ankara (25 Apr.
2000).
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of the freedom of expression. But this is also valid for religious freedom,
minority rights, and political parties.' That is why this analysis will focus on
these particular areas of incompatibility between the rulings of the ECtHR
and Turkey's jurisprudence.
Freedom of Expression
Much of the Court's caseload on the freedom of expression comes from
Turkey. As of 2012, the Court has rendered around 207 judgments on cases
originating from Turkey, with many more awaiting judgment. The judiciary
continues to attach a higher importance to the restrictions formulated in
Article 10 of the ECHR9 on freedom of expression, rather than its general
spirit and the jurisprudence of the Court:
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a
[democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and . . . it is
applicable not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or
regarded as inoffensive . . . but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the
State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of pluralism, toler-
ance and broadmindedness without which there is no "democratic society."10
judgments rendered by the ECtHR and later the reforms required by the
EU candidacy process have led to a series of constitutional amendments and
ordinary legislation in Turkey. It started with a small but significant change
made in Article 26 of the Constitution - deleting the phrase "language pro-
hibited by law" included in the text with a view to ban the use of Kurdish."
Freedom of the press benefited from a similar improvement through the
abrogation of the rule imposed by Article 28, which state that "Publications
cannot be made in a language prohibited by law." 12 In 1993, the abolition
of the state monopoly on radio and television broadcasting also contributed
to Freedom of expression by enhancing pluralism of opinion in Turkey. But
the most significant improvements in the field of freedom of expression have
been accomplished through legislative amendments. Among them, the 1991
Anti-Terror Law comes first as it repealed Articles 141, 142, and 163 of the
former Penal Code, which aimed at punishing communist and anti-secular
8. Id.
9. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 10, 1 2, opened for signature 4 Nov. 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221, Eur. TS. No. 5 (entered into force 3 Sept. 1953) [ECHRI.
10. Case of Handyside v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 5493/72, Judgment, Stras-
bourg (7 Dec. 1976).
11. Ergun Ozbudun, Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993-2004, 8 TURKISH STUD. 179,
183 (2007).
12. TURKISH CONST. art. 28 (1982).
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propaganda. Its Article 8, related to "propaganda against the indivisible
unity of the State," was abrogated in 2003, and its Article 7 was amended
in conformity with the ECtHR jurisprudence, limiting freedom of expression
only in cases of incitement to violence." The Penal Code followed with the
modification of a) its Article 312 penalizing the incitement to hostility and
hatred on the basis of class, race, religion and region, amended to limit the
criminal offense to cases of danger for public order, and b) its Article 159
related to the insult of the Republic, Turkishness, the Grand National As-
sembly, the government, the military, and the like, all considered criminal
offenses until the amendment excluded the intention of pure criticism from
this context. However, the Anti-Terror Law was amended again in 2006 to
strengthen its restrictive provisions, evidently in response to the military's
demands for more effective sanctions against terrorist activities.14
At the same time, non-violent expressions of opinion continued to be
the object of pursuit through certain provisions maintained in the Penal
Code of 2005. Article 216 allows the condemnation of those who incite
to hostility and hatred in the case of "evident and close danger," preferred
over the term "clear and present danger" used by the United States Supreme
Court, probably because it confers a larger margin of appreciation by the
prosecutors." New Article 305 prohibiting "acting against fundamental
national interests" has been illustratively justified by the Parliamentary Com-
mittee of Justice as applicable to a "citizen who called for the withdrawal
of Turkish troops from Cyprus or who declared that the Armenian genocide
took place.""6 But Article 301 (former Article 159) remains, by far, the most
controversial despite its amendment in 2008, through which the notion of
"Turkishness" has been replaced by the term "Turkish nation," the upper limit
of the three-year imprisonment has been reduced to two years, the opening
of an investigation has become dependent on the approval of the Ministry
of Justice, and the disposition on the "increase of penalty in case the insult
takes place outside Turkish territory," has been abrogated. Nevertheless, the
spirit remains and Article 301 illustrates par excellence the incompatibility
between Turkish jurisprudence and the rulings of the ECtHR. Dink v. Tur-
key is a case in point because of its highly symbolic political and human
dimensions, as well as the divergence between the interpretations of the
13. Turkish Penal Code No. 765 (1926).
14. Turkish Anti-Terror Law No. 5532 (2006).
15. Il Karaka (Turkish judge at the ECtHR), Conference, Turquie et Droits de 'Homme,
Paris Descartes University (17 Oct. 2009), available at http://www.canal-u.tv/video/
universite de-tous les.savoirs/turquie et droits-deI homme isil karakas.5212, (trans.
by authors).
16. Smith, supra note 3, at 272.
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Turkish Court of Cassation and the European Court with regard to the late
Mr. Dink's condemnation on the grounds of Article 301 .17
The ECtHR concluded that Turkey violated Article 10 of the Convention,
as opposed to the verdict reached by the Court of Cassation.'" According to
the latter, Turkishness refers to one of the constitutive elements of the state,
namely the human element, that is the "Turkish nation." As such, Turkishness
is "the whole of national and moral values, composed of human, religious
and historical values, as well as the mother tongue, patriotic feelings and
national traditions."" The judges of Strasbourg contend that the way the Court
of Cassation interpreted the notion of Turkishness had a dual impact on the
interests that Article 301 intends to safeguard. First, the notion identified with
the state and, indirectly, with the government and its policies and institu-
tions, through its reference to the Turkish nation as a constitutive element
of the state; second, by limiting Turkishness to the religious, historical, and
linguistic belongingness, the Court of Cassation excluded all such minorities
from the definition of Turkishness. Thus interpreted, for the Court of Cassa-
tion, the notions of Turkishness or Turkish nation have become the symbols
of state policy on identity. This policy on identity has been applied to the
question of the Armenian minority. Consequently, any criticism directed at
this policy, such as toward the official thesis on the events of 1915, could be
perceived as "devaluating or denigrating" Turkishness or the Turkish nation. 0
When Dink expressed his resentment against what he considered as the denial
of the events of 1915, he did nothing but communicate his ideas and opinions
on a question of incontestable general interest in a democratic society. The
Court considers it crucial for such a society that a historical debate of particular
gravity can take place freely.21
With regard to Article 10, the Court also underlined the positive obligations
of the state, such as creating a favorable environment in which all persons
are able to participate in public debates and express, without fear, their
ideas and opinions, including those contrary to the ones protected by the
authorities or held by the majority of public opinion, even if the comments
are irritating or shocking.22
17. Turkish Penal Code, Law No. 5759 (2008). Introduced by the relatives of Hrant Dink, a
Turkish journalist of Armenian origin assassinated in Istanbul on 19 January 2007 shortly
after his condemnation for denigrating "Turkishness" in his writings, the case contends
that the verdict was contrary to Article 10 of the ECHR. See ECHR, supra note 9, art.
10.
18. Affaire Dink v. Turquie, (Requites Nos. 2668/07, 6102/08, 30079/08, 7072/09, 7124/09),
Arrit, Strasbourg (14 Sept. 2010), D6finitif. (Judgment available in French only), (trans.
by authors).
19. Id. 1 28.
20. Id. 1 131-32.
21. Id. 135,
22. Id. 137.
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Yet another example of disparity between the interpretations of Turkish
and European jurisdictions is from Article 6 of the Anti-Terror Law of 2006. The
Article stipulates that the publication of any periodical containing elements
of propaganda in favor of a terrorist organization or the incitement to commit
acts of terror within such an organization can be temporarily suspended for
fifteen to thirty days. In 2009, the Turkish Constitutional Court ruled that the
Article was in conformity with the Constitution as it aimed to protect the
unity and the indivisibility of the state, deeming it a necessary rule for the
continuity of the democratic society. The ECtHR, however, had a different
interpretation of the article in the case of Orper and Others, who took to the
Court for the banning of four daily newspapers. Turkey was condemned for
violating Article 10 and the Court considered that such prior restraints on
publication entailed implicit sanctions on the applicants to dissuade them
from publishing in the future. Freedom of the press was at stake and less
draconian measures could have been envisaged. The decision to ban these
newspapers went beyond the necessary restraints in a democratic society
and practically amounted to censorship."
The above-mentioned articles continue to be used to prosecute journal-
ists, writers, editors, or academics in Turkey. The European Commission argues
that freedom of expression is undermined by the high number of legal cases
and investigations against these people and undue pressure on the media
as "Turkey's legal and judicial practices, legislation criminal procedures
and political responses are obstacles to the free exchange of information
and ideas."24 In his last report on the freedom of expression in Turkey, the
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe observed that
most of these types of violations "stem from a lack of proportionality in the
interpretation and application of the existing statutory provisions by courts
and prosecutors." 25 He also expressed his concern over the interpretation
of the concept of incitement to violence and civil defamation proceedings.
Neither of these was compliant with the case law of the ECtHR. This explains
why, despite constitutional and legislative reforms, there are such a high
number of applications pending before the Court of Strasbourg.
B. Minority Rights
The ECHR does not contain a specific article on the protection of minorities.
Article 14 and Protocol 12 on non-discrimination partly tackle the issue,
23. Case of Orper and Others v. Turkey, (Application Nos. 14526/07, 14747/07, 15022/07
,15737/07,36137/07,47245/07,50371/07,50372/07, 54637/07), Judgment, Strasbourg,
(20 Oct. 2009).
24. TURKEY PROGRESS REPORT, at ch. 23, § 4.23, (2011).
25. Report by Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of Europe
Freedom of Expression and Media Freedom in Turkey (12 July 2011), CommDH(2011)25,
available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1 814085.
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while the only other Council of Europe document on the subject, the 1995
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, is not bind-
ing. Turkey has not ratified Protocol 12, has made a reservation to Article
2 of Protocol 1 for the right to education, and is not among the forty-three
signatories of the Framework Convention. On the other hand, Turkey grants
the international rights recognized by the international organizations only
to its non-Muslim citizens by virtue of the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty, al-
though this recognition has long remained a principle rather than practice.
On the basis of this complicated equation, the study of minority rights in
Turkey, through the ECtHR jurisprudence, cannot be as systematic as in the
case of freedom of expression. As such, the Kurdish issue that transcends
all human rights problems in Turkey and that has a political dimension of
its own cannot be examined herein. Consequently, concentration is focused
on the issue of non-Muslim minorities.
The minority provisions of the Lausanne Treaty, which is considered the
founding document of the Republic, were inspired by the Polish Treaty of
1919, based upon the principles of non-discrimination and identity protec-
tion. But unlike the post-World War I treaties that determined a minority
regime, which included ethnic, linguistic, and religious criteria, Lausanne
had a selective approach reflecting the wishes of the Turkish government. This
excluded other sectarian Muslim minorities like Alevis, as well as various
ethnic and linguistic groups such as Kurds, Arabs, and those of Balkan or
Caucasus descent, falling short of international legal standards. The Western
powers accepted these terms in order to protect the non-Muslim portion of
the population. Recognized as fundamental laws by Turkey (Article 37), the
stipulations contained in Articles 38-44 of the Lausanne Treaty granted non-
Muslim minorities equality with Muslims under law.26 The treaty guaranteed
protection against discrimination, the right to establish charitable, religious,
and social institutions, and access to schools that taught native languages.
The Turkish government was made responsible for supporting and protect-
ing all of these institutions. According to Article 44, these provisions were
considered obligations of international interest and could not be modified
without the consent of the League of Nations. But Turkey's subsequent
legislation, case law, and practice introduced a long era of violations with
regard to the dispositions of the Lausanne Treaty.
In light of the "Turkification" campaigns of the early Republican era, many
laws and regulations included stipulations that explicitly required "being of
Turkish race or descent" in order, for example, to apply for public service
26. Treaty of Lausanne (1912), available at https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/boshtml/
bosl 42.htm.
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or perform certain professions. 27 Highly discriminatory practices have also
taken place, such as the 1942 Wealth Tax, aiming at eliminating non-Muslims
from the country's economic life, while violating Articles 38, 39, and 40
of the Treaty of Lausanne.28 The Incidents of 6-7 September 1955 and the
1964 extradition of Greeks with Greek passports, both ignited by the Cyprus
issue, aimed at clearing the country of non-Muslims. Although these were
of temporary nature like all crises, one issue has remained throughout time
and has played a crucial role in determining, or rather revealing, Turkey's
attitude towards these communities: the question of foundations.
Since Ottoman times, community foundations regulated the social lives
of non-Muslims and supported their religious, educational, healthcare, and
charitable institutions. They also managed immense wealth in the form of
real estate. Despite the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty, which provided
legal protection for these institutions, major laws and practices in violation
of Lausanne were introduced with a vision to exercise state control over
their management and property. The 1926 Civil Code, while approving the
establishment of new foundations, excluded non-Muslim ones by prohibiting
foundations "that support members of a certain race or community."2 9 The
1930 Municipality Law 30 provided for the transfer of cemeteries to munici-
palities and constituted the basis for taking over non-Muslim cemeteries from
their foundations. The 1935 Law on Foundations 31 required all foundations
to submit a property declaration by 1936, which they did, and non-Muslim
foundations continued to acquire property by various court decisions. But
later, the declarations made in 1936 were considered to be the founding
acts of these foundations and because they carried no provisions concerning
new acquisitions, any property acquired after 1936 was deemed illegal. This
paved the way for the seizure of hundreds of properties by the Directorate
27. See Law on Professions and Services Assigned to Turkish Citizens in Turkey, 1934 Law
No. 2510 on Settlements, 1934 Regulation No. 2/1777 on Settlement Exemptions, 1937
Vacancy Announcements of the Air Force Academy (published by the daily Cumhuriyet,
14 July 1937), Military Veterinary School (Cumhuriyet, 2 July 1938), War Academy
(Cumhuriyet, 25 Jan. 1938). These sources are on file with authors.
28. Imposed upon businessmen and producers who made unfair profit from war time ex-
port prices, the 1942 Wealth Tax has also included "others" who had to pay arbitrarily
determined taxes. The criteria for this last category were religion and ethnic origin.
Consequently, non-Muslims had to pay twice as much as those converted into Islam
and often ten times more than Muslims. The Law on Wealth Tax (11 Nov. 1942), Resm?
Cazete (Official Gazette) Issue No.5255 (12 Nov. 1942). A detailed account on its
application was provided by Faik Okte, Treasurer of Istanbul at that time, in his book
entitled, FAIK OKTE, VARLIK VERGISI FACIASI (THE TRAGEDY OF THE TURKISH CAPITAL TAX) (1951).
29. Civil Code, art.74(2) (1926), Resm? Gazete (Official Gazette) No. 339 (4 Apr.1926).
30. Municipality Law No. 1580, Resm? Gazete (Official Gazette) Issue No. 1471 (3 Apr.
1930).
31. Law for Foundations No. 2762, Resm? Gazete, (Official Gazette) Issue No. 3027 (13
June 1935).
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General of Foundations. In 1974, the Turkish Court of Cassation not only
upheld this policy but also declared minority foundations as "non-Turkish
legal persons." The language of the ruling was quite revealing in itself: "Legal
entities established by non-Turkish individuals are prohibited from acquiring
immovables. Legal entities are more powerful than natural persons, therefore
the State may face certain dangers . . . if their right to acquire immovables
is not restricted." 32
Non-Muslim foundations waged a legal war for many years against
these policies before exhausting all domestic remedies. After 1999, when
Turkey's EU candidacy became official, non-Muslims started filing complaints
before the ECtHR. The first ruling, which created a precedent for forty or
so cases, came in 2007 on the Fener Greek High School Foundation case.
The Court ruled that Turkey's real estate policy and the 1936 practice were
unlawful. The Court ordered Turkey to re-register the seized property to the
foundation's name within three months of the final judgment date or pay
890,000 euros to the foundation if the re-registration did not occur within
the three months." Shortly after this ruling, the two consecutive complaints
by the Foundation for the Surp Pirgig Armenian Hospital in Istanbul for the
return of its three buildings by the Treasury were concluded against Turkey.
The parties opted for friendly settlement, but when the Court recommended
paying more than 2 million euros as a condition of friendly settlement,
Turkey decided to return the properties instead, which created a second
precedent.3 4 The second conviction for confiscating the property of a non-
Muslim foundation concerned the orphanage building belonging to the
Fener Greek Patriarchate on the Prince's Island in Istanbul. The ECtHR ruled
that taking over the orphanage built in 1902 for Greek Orthodox children
breached Article I of Protocol 1 of the ECHR, protecting property rights. 5
As this was followed by three different convictions over various properties
of an Armenian foundation in just 2008 alone, it became clear that Turkey
could not escape Strasbourg's pressure.
As a result, along with various EU-induced reform packages, the Law on
Foundations was amended three times in five years. First, foundations were
allowed to acquire property under government supervision, then, control
32. General Board of the Court of Cassation, Decision No. E. 1971/2-820, K. 1974/505 (8
May 1974). Yargitay Kararlar Dergisi (YKD) (Court of Cassation Reports) 8/1975, at 16
(on file with authors).
33. Case of Fener Greek High School Foundation v. Turkey, Application No. 34478/97,
Judgment, Strasbourg, (9 Jan. 2007).
34. MEHMET ATILGAN, ONAT EREN, NORA MILDANOGLU & MEHMET POLATEL, 2012 DECLARATION:THE SEIZED
PROPERTIES OF ARMENIAN FOUNDATIONS IN ISTANBUL 142-43 (2012) See also Cases of Foundation
for the Armenian Surp Pirgig Hospital in Yedikule v. Turkey (Application Nos. 50147/99,
51207/99), Friendly Settlement, Strasbourg, (26 June 2007).
35. Case of Fener Greek Patriarchate (Ecumenical Patriarchate) v. Turkey (Application no.
14340/05), Judgment, Strasbourg, (8 July 2008).
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was transferred the to the Directorate General on Foundations, and finally
they released this right and ruled for the return of seized property under
certain conditions." But the most spectacular change was the further amend-
ment of this new law by decree of the Council of Ministers in August 2011.
Provisional Article 17 of the new law (No. 5737) ruled for the return of all
properties seized through the 1936 Declaration as well as compensation to
be paid for those now belonging to third persons.37 Since then, many proper-
ties were returned to the foundations, including the orphanage building in
November 2010. According to a decision in April 2012 by the Directorate
General on Foundations, all non-Muslim cemeteries are also to be returned
to their communities, thus abrogating the 1930 Municipality Law. In the
meantime, twenty-four more foundations addressed the Directorate General
for the return of immovable properties that they used to possess in the past.
While political will has ended up prevailing over the judiciary in this
long and painful saga, some serious problems remain. There is a lack of legal
personality for religious communities. For example, the Greek Orthodox
Patriarchate's claim to use the title "ecumenical," which has thus far been
rejected by the Turkish government, and the re-opening of the Heybeliada
Greek Orthodox theological college (the Halki seminary), which had been
closed since 1971. Turkey refused the appointment of foreign clergy as a
solution to the Halki problem. In its decision of 26 June 2007, the Court of
Cassation upheld the official position to the effect that only those of Turkish
nationality could work in Turkey and that the Patriarchate was devoid of
legal personality. Whereas the Venice Commission adopted a stance at its
12-13 March 2010 meeting on those three inter-related issues and quoted
several decisions by the ECtHR. The Court stressed that freedom of religion
is not merely an individual right but also has a collective dimension. Conse-
quently, Article 9 of the ECHR on freedom of religion should be interpreted
in conjunction with Article 11 on freedom of association. 8 Thus, once again,
the rulings of the ECtHR stand in opposition with the jurisprudence of the
Turkish high courts.
C. Party Closures
Turkish legislation and practices with regard to party closures constitute
one of the most important "democracy deficits" in Turkey. The long list of
prohibitions in Articles 68 and 69 of the current Constitution is further ag-
36. Law on Foundations (No. 5737) ratified by the Turkish parliament on (20 Feb. 2008).
37. Resm? Cazete (Official Gazette), Issue No. 28038 (27 Aug. 2011).
38. Ergun Ozbudun, "Democratic Opening," the Legal Status of Non-Muslim Religious
Communities and the Venice Commission, 12 INSIGHT TURKEY 214 (2010).
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gravated by an even longer and more draconian list in the Law on Political
Parties.39 Thus, under Article 80 of this law, political parties shall not aim
at changing the unitary nature of the state. Under Article 81, they shall not
"maintain that there are minorities in the territory of Turkey, based on dif-
ferences of national or religious culture, or race, or language;" they shall
not "harm national unity by way of creating minorities in the territory of the
Republic of Turkey through protecting, developing or spreading languages
and cultures other than the Turkish language or culture;" and shall not use
material in languages other than Turkish in their propaganda and political
activities. Under Article 85, they shall not demean the personality, activities,
and memory of Ataturk; and under Article 89, they shall not aim at chang-
ing the official status of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. To aggravate the
situation further, the Turkish Constitutional Court has implemented these
provisions with an excessive zeal and rigidity. Thus, it has closed down six
parties under the 1961 Constitution, and nineteen parties under the 1982
Constitution. Most of these rulings were based on the alleged violations of
the constitutional provisions protecting the indivisible national and territorial
integrity of the state or its secular character.
An example of the Turkish Constitutional Court's restrictive interpretation
of the territorial unity of the state can be found in its ruling on the Demo-
cratic Party. The Court stated that
The Constitution which is based on the principle of unitary state, does
not permit federal state. Therefore, political parties cannot include fed-
eral system in their program, and cannot advocate such a structure....
As the principle of nation-state does not permit the notion of a multi-
national state, there is no room for a federal structure in such a system.40
In the same ruling, the Court preclude even regional states by stating
that "the Constitution is closed to such discriminatory procedures as au-
tonomy or self-rule for regions," even though a regional state is a variant of
a unitary state. 4 1 Evidently, the Court confuses the Constitution in force with
the demands for peacefully changing it, federalism with multi-nationalism,
and regionalism with federalism. Expectedly, the ECtHR found the closure
of the Democratic Party as a violation of the Convention.42
39. This was also adopted during the National Security Council (NSC) rule, Law No. 2820
(22 Apr. 1983). See Law on Political Parties, Resm? Gazete (Official Gazette), Issue No.
18027 (24 Apr. 1983).
40. Constitutional Court Decision, E. 1993/3, K. 1994/2 (16 June 1994), ANAYASA MAHKEMESI
KARARLAR DERGISI (AMKD) (CONSTITUTIONAL COURT REPORTS), VOL.2, No. 30, at.1 199-1201I.See
also Court's ruling on the Socialist Party, E. 1991/2, K. 1992/1, (10 July 1992), AMKD,
VOL. 2, No.28, at 696-831, esp. 701, 804-05, (trans. by the authors).
41. Id.
42. Case of the Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, (Application No. 20/1997/804/1007),
Judgment, Strasbourg, 25 May 1998. See also Ergun Ozbudun, Party Prohibition Cases:
Different Approaches by the Turkish Constitutional Court and the European Court of
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Despite some relatively modest improvements brought about by the
constitutional amendments of 2001 and 2010, Turkish legislation and prac-
tice concerning the prohibition of parties are still far from being in confor-
mity with the current European standards. The Venice Commission, in an
influential report adopted in 1999 and entitled "Guidelines on Prohibition
and Dissolution of Political Parties and Analogous Measures," argued that
prohibition or enforced dissolution of political parties may only be justified
in the case of parties that advocate the use of violence or use violence as a
means to overthrow the democratic constitutional order, thereby undermining
the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact that a party
advocates a peaceful change to the Constitution should not be sufficient for
its prohibition or dissolution. 43
The standards developed by the ECtHR seem somewhat more restric-
tive than those of the Venice Commission. Thus, the ECtHR decided in the
Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) case that not only the means used by a politi-
cal party "must be legal and democratic," but also the change proposed
must itself be compatible with the fundamental democratic principles. It
necessarily follows that a political party whose leaders incite violence or
put forward a policy that fails to respect democracy or aims at the destruc-
tion of democracy cannot lay claim to the Convention's protection against
penalties imposed on these grounds. In view of the very clear link between
the Convention and democracy, no one must be authorized to rely on the
Convention's provisions in order to weaken or destroy the ideals and values
of a democratic society."
Turkish rules and practices concerning the prohibition of political parties
deviate from common European norms from a procedural point of view, in
that the power to start prohibition proceedings rests solely with the Chief
Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation. In a report on Turkey, the Venice
Commission criticizes this system stating that
the Turkish model of giving this competence to one official-the Public Pros-
ecutor-makes the system subject to his discretion, which is problematic since
Human Rights, 17 DEMOCRATIZATION 125 (2010); Mustafa Kogak & Esin Orco, Dissolution
of Political Parties in the Name of Democracy: Cases from Turkey and the European
Court of Human Rights, 9 Eur. Pub. L. 399 (2009).
43. Venice Commission, Guidelines on Prohibition and Dissolution of Political Parties and
Analogous Measures, Venice, (10-11 Dec. 1999), CDL-INF (2000), 1.
44. Case of Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, (Application Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98,
41343/98 and 41344/98), Judgment, Grand Chamber, Strasbourg, (13 Feb. 2003).
The ECtHR maintained the same reasoning in its ruling on the Case of Yazar, Karata§,
Aksoy and the People's Labour Party (HEP) v. Turkey, (Application No. 22723/93/ECHR
408) Judgment, Strasbourg, (9 Apr. 2002), as well as Affaire Dicle pour le Parti de la
D6mocratie (DEP) v. Turquie, (Requite no. 25141/94), Arrit, Strasbourg, (10 Dec. 2002).
In both cases, the Court ruled that the closure of these parties constituted a violation of
the Constitution.
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the initiation of the procedure by itself will normally be a dramatic event that
may have severe impact on the political climate and may cause considerable
instability4 5
[T]his stands in contrast to other European countries that have rules on party
closure, in which-because of the exceptional nature of such cases-the decision
to raise a case either rests with the democratic political institutions or at least is
subject to some element of direct or indirect democratic control.4 6
The Commission further observes that
the most striking feature of the Turkish rules on party closure is that they com-
bine a very long list of material criteria for prohibition or dissolution with a
very low procedural threshold.... The basic problem with the present Turkish
rules on party closure is that the general threshold is too low, both for initiating
procedures for and for prohibiting or dissolving parties. 47
Finally, other consequences of closure rulings, such as the forfeiture of
parliamentary seats for those deputies of the party who caused its closure by
their own words and deeds (Article 84 of the Constitution), and the five year
ban on political activities for those members who caused the closure of the
party by their own words and deeds (Article 69) were found disproportionate
by the ECtHR; therefore, they constituted a violation of Article 3 of Protocol
1 on the freedom of election.48 The provisions on the forfeiture of parliamen-
tary membership were repealed by the constitutional amendments of 2010.
The Constitutional Court has also interpreted and implemented the
constitutional provisions on secularism with an excessive zeal and ri-
gidity. Thus, it has closed down five parties on account of their alleged
anti-secular activities. These are the National Order Party (20 May 1971),
Turkey Peace Party (25 October 1983), Freedom and Democracy Party (23
November 1993), Welfare Party (16 January 1998), and the Virtue Party (22
June 2001). More recently, the Court ruled that Turkey's present governing
party (the Justice and Development Party, AKP) had become a focal point
of anti-secular activities, but availing itself of the opportunity presented by
the 2001 constitutional amendment, decided to deprive it of half of its state
funding for the next year, instead of closing it down. Interestingly, the Court's
45. Venice Commission, Opinion on the Constitutional and Legal provisions Relevant to the
prohibition of Political Parties in Turkey, adopted, 78th Plenary Session, Venice (13-14
Mar. 2009), CDL-AD (2009), 006, 86.
46. Id. 85.
47. Id. T 30.
48. Case of Sadak and Others v. Turkey (No. 2), (Application Nos. 25144/94, 26149/95 to
26154/95, 27100/95, 27101/95) Judgment, Strasbourg, (11 June 2002); Affaire Kavaky
v. Turquie (Requite No. 71907/01), Arrit, Strasbourg, (5 July 2007); Affaire Ilicak v.
Turquie (Requite No. 15394/02), Arrit, Strasbourg, (15 Mar. 2007); Case of Sobaci v.
Turkey (Application No. 26733/02), Judgment, Strasbourg, (29 Feb. 2008).
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main piece of evidence for the AKP's alleged anti-secular activities was the
2008 constitutional amendment that aimed to abolish the headscarf ban at
universities.4 9 Of these prohibition rulings, many were found by the ECtHR
to be in violation of the ECHR. The only exception was the WP (Welfare
Party, RP) case where the ECtHR decided that there had been no violation
of the Convention, citing certain statements by the RP spokesmen "who
had publicly referred with approval to the possibility of using force against
politicians who opposed them,"so and arguing on the other hand that the
RP's advocacy for a sharia-based government, particularly its proposal for a
plurality of legal systems, were not compatible with democracy. The ECtHR
concluded that it is difficult to declare one's respect for democracy and
human rights while simultaneously supporting a regime based on sharia,
which clearly diverges from Convention values, particularly with regard to
criminal law and procedure. The rules on the legal status of women and
intervention in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with
religious precepts that are a part of sharia law do not conform to the values
of the Convention. "In the Court's view, a political party whose actions seem
to be aimed at introducing sharia in a state party to the Convention can
hardly be regarded as an association complying with the democratic ideal
that underlies the whole of the Convention.""
In sum, the effects of the ECtHR rulings on Turkish legislation and practice
of party prohibitions seem to be limited, although in a modestly positive
direction. Thus, the forfeiture of parliamentary membership, as a result of the
closure ruling of the Constitutional Court, was repealed by the constitutional
amendments of 2010. The same amendment also raised the quorum for a
prohibition ruling from three-fifths to two-thirds of the Constitutional Court
judges, thus making the closure of parties more difficult. However, certain
other liberalizing measures in the amendment proposal failed to receive the
requisite majority of the Assembly and were dropped from the proposal,
such as repealing the political bans imposed upon certain party members
who caused the prohibition of their party by their own words and actions.
The ECtHR also found this penalty excessive and disproportionate. On the
other hand, there seems to be a modest improvement in the rulings of the
Constitutional Court in recent years. Thus, in 2008, the Court decided to
deprive the AKP of half of its state funding for one year instead of closing
it down, even though the ruling was still based on an excessively rigid and
militant understanding of secularism.52 Even more significantly, the Court,
49. Constitutional Court Decision, E. 2008/16, K. 2008/116 (05 June 2008), Resm? Gazete
(Official Gazette), Issue No. 26905 (13 June 2008).
50. Case of Refah Partisi, supra note 44, 1 131.
51. Id. 123.
52. Const. Ct. Dec., supra note 49.
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again in the 2008 ruling, refused to close down HAK-PAR (Hak ve Ozgurlukler
Partisi) even though the party's program contained fairly radical proposals
with regard to the Kurdish question.13 In both of the AKP and HAK-PAR
cases, the Court approvingly cited certain passages from the rulings of the
ECtHR. On the less positive side, the Court refused to reopen the trial in
the case of the United Communist Party of Turkey (TBKP), even though the
new 2004 Turkish Criminal Procedure Law explicitly cited violation rulings
of the ECtHR as grounds for a retrial. In the case of the TBKP, the ECtHR
ruled that its closure constituted a violation of the Convention.54
III. PART II: THE TURKISH JUDICIARY AS THE CORE ISSUE: PROBLEMS
AND DEVELOPMENTS
It is self-evident that, despite an impressive record of constitutional and
legislative reforms realized by the Turkish government in the last decade,
the ECtHR continues to remain the ultimate recourse for defending civil
and political rights in Turkey. This indicates that the problem lies with the
prevailing mentality and standard operating procedures of the judiciary and
state apparatus.
A. Attitudinal Problems within the Judiciary
Civic nationalism and state-centrism constitute the core values and refer-
ences for the Turkish judiciary and bureaucracy. The particular strength of
Turkish nationalism stems from the supra-ideological status that has been
conferred to it since the early years of the Republic. This was done in order
to create a "pure" Turkish identity as opposed to the cosmopolitan nature
of the Ottoman Empire. This ethno-confessional approach, based on the
unity of race and religion, has been further enhanced by a centralized and
authoritarian system of education as well as the traditional influence of the
military. Moreover, the historical experience of a dismantled Empire at the
end of World War I has exacerbated a constant perception of threat, origi-
nating from external and internal "enemies" that could endanger national
unity and territorial integrity." As a result, Turkey inherited a militant, and
53. Constitutional Court Decision, E. 2002/1, K. 2008/1, (29 Jan. 2008), Resm? Gazete (Of-
ficial Gazette), Issue No. 26923 (1 July 2008).
54. Constitutional Court Decision, E. 2003/6, K. 2008/4, (8 Jan. 2008), Resm? Gazete (Of-
ficial Gazette), Issue No. 26824 (22 Mar. 2008).
55. For an analysis of Turkish nationalism, see Fusun Turkmen, La Mont6e du Nationalisme
en Turquie: Continuit6 et Changement, in TURQUIE, EUROPE:LE RETOUR DEs NATIONALISMES?
111-34 (Fbsun TOrkmen ed., 2010).
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often on the verge of paranoid, nationalism as the main component of
collective mentality. This is best reflected by the principles and practice of
the state apparatus, suspicious of the "Other," be it liberals, minorities, or
international institutions. This explains the negative approach of the Turkish
courts toward the rights of the individuals by their refusal or incapacity to
implement the ECHR.
As a major impediment to the development of political liberalism,
the Turkish legal complex has been mobilised to consolidate the regime by
both eliminating the potential threats and providing legal justifications for the
authoritarian behaviour of the regime. Thus the legal complex has functioned
as part and parcel of both the repressive and ideological state apparatus, to
use Althusser's terms. The Turkish legal complex, the judiciary at its centre,
has consistently sought to align itself with the ruling stratum of the Republic. 16
This has led to the politicization of the judiciary and the judicialization of
politics.
Besides the jurisprudence itself, the above arguments are justified by
data provided by the most comprehensive research and through polling
conducted among theTurkish judiciary in recent years.57 Based on "in-depth
interviews," this research aimed at shedding light on the thought processes
of judges and prosecutors and how they approach the concepts of state,
justice, and rights. Some of their answers are worth quoting: "If my country
is at stake, if my homeland or nation is at stake, I do not care about law!," 8
"My state; first comes my state!," 9 "Which one has more priority: the state
or the democracy? . . . As the Public Prosecutor of course I have to protect
the state and the regime. I am the regime's prosecutor."so In another study
based on an analysis of some decisions of the Constitutional Court and the
Court of Cassation, it is concluded that judicial authorities act with a stat-
ist reflex in a considerable portion of the decisions they cast. Particularly
in cases with political content, efforts such as "protecting the state" and
"observing the interests of the state" do indeed exist.61
The attitude toward the amendment to Article 90 of the Constitution is
quite revealing of the judiciary's perception of international law. Most of the
judges and prosecutors consider the prevailing of international agreements
56. ZThtu Arslan, Reluctantly Sailing Towards Political Liberalism: The Political Role of
the judiciary in Turkey, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LEGAL
COMPLEX AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM 220-23 (Terence C. Halliday et al. eds., 2007).
57. SUAvI AYDIN, MERYEM ERDAL, MITHAT SANCAR & EYLEM UMIT ATILGAN, JUST EXPECTATIONS: A COMPILA-
TION OF TESEV RESEARCH STUDIES ON THE JUDICIARY IN TURKEY (Asena Gunal ed, Suzan Balme
trans., 2009).
58. Id. at 34, (Interview 1).
59. Id. at 35, (Interview 5).
60. Id. 35, (Interview 34).
61. Id. at 37, n.30.
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over domestic law in case of conflict as a violation of national sovereignty.
Some of them question the amendment, "What does it mean that the Par-
liament cannot issue laws against international conventions? Then where
does this leave our sovereignty!"62 Others simply reject it on ultra-nationalist
grounds. "I do not find pertinent or appropriate any of the signatures put
under any convention that is binding on Turkey . . . the officials going there
do not know our culture or our history."" As far as the rulings of the ECtHR
are concerned, they are perceived by some as "prejudiced" and indicator
of "the double standard" of the Court against Turkey, whereas others think
they are "not so prejudiced" and "accurate." But even the latter "admit"
that the judges of Strasbourg "sometimes give political decisions." A large
majority of the interviewees, regardless of whether they have a positive or
negative approach to the amendment of Article 90, stated that the interna-
tional human rights norms are not taken into account in trials. 65
The judicial mentality described above can be attributed to the special
features of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization process. The late Ottoman
modernization was carried out by a small, Westernized bureaucratic and
military elite, often disregarding the more traditional and religious attitudes
of the masses. This pattern also shaped the modernizing reforms of the early
republican period even in a more radical mood. Both the YoungTurk revolu-
tion (1908-1918) and the Kemalist revolution (1920-1946) can be described
as examples of top-down revolutions, or "revolutions from above." Both
revolutions were carried out by strongly nationalist and militantly secularist
elites. Therefore, the ruling military and bureaucratic elites, including the
judiciary, saw as their "mission" to preserve the legacy of a national, unitary,
and secular state, if necessary, at the cost of democratic rights and freedoms.
Part of this legal and political culture, again with roots going back to the
Ottoman times, is the tendency to give priority to the "sublime interests of
the state" as opposed to the individual rights and freedoms. This pattern
goes a long way in explaining the generally illiberal and statist attitudes of
the judiciary.
B. Recent Structural Reforms in the judiciary
1. Issues Relating to the Independence of the Judiciary and the
Security of Tenure for judges
It goes without saying that for the independence of the judiciary to carry any
real meaning, the security of tenure for judges should be effectively guaran-
62. Id. at 42 (Interview 14).
63. Id. at 43, (Interview 32).
64. Id. at 43-44, (Interviews 35, 21).
65. Id. at 45.
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teed. In most Western democracies, this is secured by the establishment of
high judicial councils, which are independent of the executive, to deal with
the personal matters of judges, such as appointments, promotions, transfers,
disciplinary proceedings, and dismissals. Although there is no single European
model for the composition of such councils, the most widespread practice
is to have a mixed body, the majority of which consists of judges elected
by their peers. Thus, in a 2007 report, the Venice Commission stated that:
A balance needs to be struck between judicial independence and self-admin-
istration on the one side and the necessary accountability of the judiciary on
the other side in order to avoid negative effects of corporatism within the judi-
ciary. . . . One way to achieve this goal is to establish a judicial council with
a balanced composition of its members. . . . An overwhelming supremacy of
the judicial component may raise concerns related to the risks of "corporatist
management." The participation of the legislative branch in the composition of
such an authority is characteristic. In a system guided by democratic principles,
it seems reasonable that the Council of Justice should be linked to the repre-
sentation of the will of the people, as expressed by Parliament.66
In Turkey, the High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (HCJP) regulated
by the original version of the 1982 Constitution (Article 159) has been one
of the most hotly debated constitutional issues. Under this arrangement,
three regular and three alternate members were appointed by the President
of the Republic from among three times as many candidates nominated by
the plenary session of the Council of the State. The Minister of Justice was
the Chairman of the Council, and the Undersecretary of the Ministry of
Justice was an ex-officio member.
The constitutional amendment of 2010 introduced important changes
in the structure and functions of the HCJP. Thus, the number of its mem-
bers was increased from seven regular and five substitutes to twenty-two
regular and twelve substitutes, and it was stipulated that the Council would
work in three sections. The Minister of Justice remained as the President of
the Council and the Undersecretary of the Ministry an ex-officio member.
Three regular and three substitute members shall be elected by the plenary
of the Court of Cassation from among its own members, two regular and
two substitute members by the plenary of the Council of State from among
66. Venice Commission, "Judicial Appointments," Report adopted at its 70th Plenary session,
Venice, (16-17 Mar. 2007), CDL-AD (2007)028, 11 27-31. The Commission reiterated
its opinion in a more recent report, stating that "in all cases the council should have
a pluralistic composition with a substantial part, if not the majority, of members being
judges. With the exception of ex-officio members these judges should be elected or ap-
pointed by their peers," "Report on the independence of the Judicial System: Part 1: The
Independence of Judges," Venice Commission, (11-12 Dec. 2009), CDL (2010)006,
32. Also in favor of a mixed composition for the judicial council, Consultative Council
of European Judges, Opinion No. 10, Strasbourg, (21-23 Nov. 2007).
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its own members, one regular and one substitute member by the plenary
of the Turkish Academy of Justice from among its own members, seven
regular and four substitute members by all judges and public prosecutors
of general courts from among first degree judges and public prosecutors,
and three regular and two substitute members by all administrative court
judges and public prosecutors from among first degree administrative judges
and public prosecutors. The amended Article 159 also stipulated that four
regular members shall be elected from among law professors and practicing
lawyers by the President of the Republic.
Clearly, the present arrangement has the advantage of representing the
entire judiciary, not only the two high courts. Indeed, close to half of its
regular members (ten out of twenty-two) are elected by all general and admin-
istrative judges and public prosecutors, in addition to five regular members
elected by the two high courts, without any interference by the executive
branch. "Thus, the judge members constitute an almost two-thirds majority
of the Council with regard to the four members elected by the President of
the Republic from among qualified persons."6
The Venice Commission, in an opinion adopted in December 2010,
stated that the changes reflected "the criteria of the Venice Commission on a
number of points and should, in general, be welcomed as a substantive and
definite step in the right direction" before concluding that "the new HSYK
is formally a much more independent institution than its predecessor, and
the new system formally fulfills most European standards."68
2. Constitutional Complaint
The original text of the 1982 Constitution did not recognize the right to put
forward a constitutional complaint for individuals. The 2010 amendment to
Article 148 introduces this right. Thus, it is stipulated that:
Everyone may apply to the Constitutional Court on the grounds that one of the
fundamental rights and freedoms within the scope of the European Convention
on Human Rights which are guaranteed by the Constitution has been violated
by public authorities. In order to make an application, ordinary legal remedies
must be exhausted. In the individual application, judicial review shall not be
made for matters which would be taken into account during the process of re-
course to legal remedies. Procedures and principles concerning the individual
application shall be laid down in law.
67. ERGUN OZBUDUN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF TURKEY: 1876 TO THE PRESENT 105 (2011).
68. Venice Commission, Interim Opinion on the Draft Law on the High Council for Judges
and Public Prosecutors (of 27 Sept. 2010) of Turkey, (17-18 Dec. 2010), CDL-AD
(2010)042, 11 26-28.
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The introduction of constitutional complaint has long been advocated
for by a majority of legal scholars and human rights activists, even though
the two high courts remained cool to the idea for fear that it would elevate
the Constitutional Court to the position of a super appellate court over the
decisions of the two high courts. Clearly, however, the Constitutional Court's
examination will not be extended to the facts of the case, but will be limited
to an examination of the question of unconstitutionality.
The details related to constitutional complaints have been regulated by
Law No. 6216, dated 30 March 2011, according to which such complaints
are examined by one of the two sections of the Court presided over by a
Deputy President of the Court and composed of seven members (Article
22). No constitutional complaints are allowed against legislative acts or the
regulatory acts of the administration (Article 45(3)). If a violation is caused
by a judicial decision, the case is referred back to the relevant court for a
retrial. In cases where no legal benefit can be obtained from a retrial, the
applicant may be awarded compensation (Article 50). The Law stipulates
that the Court shall examine constitutional complaints against the acts that
became final after 23 September 2012 (transitional Article 1(8)).61
C. Areas Still in Need of Reform in the judiciary
Despite the above mentioned developments, there are still major problems
with the Turkish judiciary, as reflected by the high percentage of ECtHR
judgments on the violations of Article 6 of the Convention, which secured
the right to a fair trial: 700 out of 2,200 judgments pronounced against
Turkey in the period 1995-201 0.70 These problems have been identified as
follows:
1. Excessive Length of Proceedings and Resort to Remands in Custody
As of 22 September 2011, the execution of 233 judgments concerning exces-
sively lengthy procedures before all types of courts in Turkey was pending
before the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers.71 In 2010 alone, the
ECtHR found that in eighty-three cases there had been violations of the
Convention owing to the excessive length of proceedings before Turkish
courts.72 This problem, with major human rights implications, is due to:
69. See Resm? Gazete (Official Gazette) Issue No. 27894 (3 Apr. 2011).
70. Report by Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of Europe,
Administration of justice and Protection of Human Rights in Turkey (10 Jan. 2012)
CommDH(2012)2, at 5.
71. Id. at 13.
72. Id. at 13.
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heavy workload of the judiciary, lack of competent personnel, automati-
cally granted adjournments, over-reliance of the prosecutors on the police
forces in the investigation, the long-established practice of going from arrest
of suspected persons toward evidence rather than the opposite, immediate
initiating of proceedings by prosecutors, preparation of long, intricate and
often irrelevant indictments, and the lack of an effective domestic remedy
to challenge the length of proceedings before the outcome of an ongoing
trial. 73 Excessive resort to and length of detention on remand in violation of
Article 5 of the Convention, which secures the right to liberty, is yet another
problem, with 144 judgments of the ECtHR under supervision of execution
by the Committee of Ministers. The Court repeatedly found that Turkish
courts fail to justify appropriately their decisions of detention in custody,
do not resort to other alternatives, and do not take into account the health
conditions of the detained. All of these characteristics constitute violations
of Article 3 of the ECHR, which secures the prohibition of torture and other
cruel or degrading treatment.
2. The Role of Courts in Combating Impunity for Serious Human
Rights Violations
The ineffectiveness of domestic proceedings relating to serious human rights
violations by members of security forces has been a major concern for a
long time. The Court of Strasbourg has ruled on a large number of violations
of Article 2, which secures the right to life, and Article 3, resulting from the
actions of the Turkish security forces.74 Despite recent reforms in the Turkish
Code of Criminal Procedure, the findings of the ECtHR seem to confirm the
structural nature of the problem of impunity in Turkey, as demonstrated by
many cases where criminal proceedings brought against police officers, who
practiced torture, have been inadequate or by cases in which the state failed
to protect the victim's life, such as in the case of Hrant Dink." Moreover, the
practice of police officers accused of misconduct bringing charges against
the plaintiffs who, in turn, do not benefit from an effective police complaint
mechanism, is against the principles established in the case law of the ECtHR
concerning effective investigations.7 6 The disproportionately lenient sentences
by Turkish courts, including high courts, toward security forces that have per-
petrated serious human rights violations, are another matter of concern.7" All of
the above demonstrate the highly state-centric approach of the Turkish judge.
73. Id. at 7-9.
74. Case of Aksoy v. Turkey (1996), precedent to 200 cases; Case of Bat[ and others v. Turkey
(2004), precedent to more than sixty cases.
75. Case of Serdar Guzel v. Turkey (2011) is a case in point, as indicated in Hammarberg
Report, supra note 70, at 14, T 49.
76. See Opinion of the Commissioner for Human Rights concerning Effective Determination
of Complaints against the Police, Strasbourg, (12 Mar. 2009), CommDH (2009)30.
77. See Hammarberg Report, supra note 70, at 16.
1006 Vol. 35
Impact of ECtHR Rulings on Turkey's Democracy
3. Other Major Problems in Criminal Proceedings
Other major problems in criminal proceedings include a) the courts' inter-
pretation of the Turkish Anti-Terror Act which allows a very wide margin of
appreciation and results in countless convictions on the grounds of "member-
ship in a terrorist organization," b) restrictions of the right to defense such
as no access to the prosecution file by the defense lawyer, no practice of
cross-examination, and acceptance of testimonies by "secret witnesses" while
the defense has difficulties in summoning witnesses, and c) derogations from
ordinary criminal procedures applied by assize courts with special powers
dealing with crimes against the security of the state with longer detention
periods, incommunicado custody, restrictions imposed upon the defense,
and trials in absentia.78
Against this background and concerned by the high number of judg-
ments delivered by the ECtHR against Turkey, the Commissioner for Human
Rights in the Council of Europe considered in his latest report on the subject
"that the effective implementation of these judgments requires amendments
of the letter and spirit of the Turkish Constitution, statutory legislation and
regulations, institutional changes, awareness-raising and capacity-building
within the judicial system."79
IV. CONCLUSION
This study has tried to show that the impact of the ECtHR rulings on Tur-
key's legislations and judicial practices has been on the whole positive but
limited. Despite considerable improvements brought about by constitutional
amendments and changes in ordinary laws, major democratic deficits and
inconsistencies with the standard European human rights practices remain
wide. Such inconsistencies, as described above, concern mostly freedom of
expression, freedom of association (especially in connection with the party
prohibition rules), minority rights, the length of judicial proceedings, and
excessively long detention periods.
On 11 April 2013, Law No. 6459, commonly referred to as the "fourth
judiciary reform bill," was adopted. The law's declared aim is to improve
Turkey's standing before the European Court of Human Rights, especially
with regard to freedom of expression. The 27 article law introduces a num-
ber of significant improvements.80 Thus, the second paragraph of Article 6
of the Anti-Terror law, which criminalizes those who publish declarations
and statements of terrorist organizations, was narrowed to statements that
78. Id. at 16-21.
79. Id. at 27.
80. Laws in the Context of Human Rights and Freedom of Expression (No. 6459) (11 Apr.
2013), Resm? Gazete, (Official Gazette) Issue No. 28633 (30 Apr. 2013).
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legitimize, praise, or encourage violent actions. Identical amendments were
made in Article 7 (paragraph 2) of the same law criminalizing propaganda for
terrorist organizations and Article 220 of the Turkish Criminal Code, which
penalizes propaganda for conspiratorial organizations that were established
for the purpose of committing crimes. Article 94 of Turkish Criminal Code
was amended to abolish the statute of limitations for torture crimes. Article
215 of the same law, which forbids the praising of crimes and criminals,
was amended so that such action would constitute a criminal offense only
if it leads to a "clear and present danger to public order." The controversial
Article 318 of the same law that criminalizes anti-militarist propaganda was
narrowed to such statements intended to encourage fugitives from military
services. On the other hand, the law did not introduce improvements to the
long detention periods and the controversial Article 301 of the Criminal Code
that penalizes insulting the Turkish nation and certain public institutions.
This law is an important step toward bringing Turkish legislation closer to
European standards, even though liberal critics regard it as insufficient to
meet expectations. However, very few releases have taken place following
the publication of the law in cases where thousands of Kurdish militants
have been under trial, in detention on allegations of terrorist propaganda
or aiding and abetting members of the terrorist organization. This is another
piece of evidence of the pro-state, illiberal mentality of the Turkish judiciary
as alluded to above.
The slowness of the democratic reform process is partly due to the
increasing Turkish disenchantment with the EU-accession negotiations.
Indeed, between 1999 and 2006 the hope for full membership in the near
future provided a strong stimulus for democratic reforms, including major
constitutional amendments and nine "harmonization packages" designed
to adapt Turkish legislation to the EU standards. However, objections by
important EU-member states toward Turkey's full membership, even in the
long run, created a sense of hopelessness in the Turkish public opinion. This
was indicated by the declining level of support for the EU membership, and
resulted in a weakening of the EU's leverage on the democratization process.
A second factor is the unwillingness of the Turkish judiciary, in gen-
eral, to conform to the European human rights standards. Indeed, the 2004
amendment to Article 90 of the Constitution, which placed the provisions
of international human rights conventions above Turkish domestic laws,
had the potential to lead to an almost revolutionary improvement in Turk-
ish human rights standards. However, as pointed out above, the Turkish
judiciary's attitudes toward it can, at best, be termed as lukewarm, if not
outright cool. The Turkish judiciary's statist and nationalist perceptions can
be explained by the specific characteristics of theTurkish modernization and
of its nation-building process. The result is an interesting paradox that the
judiciary, in most countries the most ardent supporter of human rights and
individual liberties, has often been less liberal than the elected branches of
government in Turkey.
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